

MORANDUM FOR: *Y/DCI/IC*

*It's a big bite -
maybe too big at one
gulp - Shouldn't we
select a few nibbles
& start - WEC*

(DATE)
5/29/73

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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

NOTES FOR MEETING WITH MR. COLBY

Basic Problems, Prime Responsibility of Product Review Group

1. Current and Crisis Intelligence Support to White House and NSC.

a. The current intelligence reporting system is not satisfying the users:

-There is a plethora of classified "newspapers" (the PDB, several CIBs, DIA's INTSUMs, INR's DIPSUM, NSA's SIGINT Summary) distributed throughout the government. ✓

- Any really important item (to users) in these hard-copy products has almost always been reported earlier through other means--often the news wire services. ✓

-The current intelligence publications lump together very low classification and unclassified matters with very sensitive matters, inviting security leaks. Need-to-know is seriously compromised by distribution. ?

b. Crisis intelligence reporting also fails to satisfy users:

-The normal current intelligence system cannot handle the problem, so the various agencies go into high gear, inundating the user with direct inputs of uncoordinated reports and quick analyses. ✓

-Intelligence agencies are frequently in the dark concerning US actions. (and what for?)

-There is a good deal of "gamesmanship" practiced in responding to high-level requests for intelligence which tends to put a premium on avoiding coordination between agencies. ✓

2. Estimates and other In-Depth Analyses.

a. The NIEs and the NIE process have received severe criticism from users:

-The military NIEs have become catalogs of detailed information on foreign armed forces and their weaponry, with a certain amount of philosophizing added.

-Few of them are used by the decisionmakers they purport to serve. DOD uses its own detailed military intelligence (formatted as required by that Department) for planning purposes; NSC uses intelligence inputs to NSSMs. ✓

-The traditional system for selecting NIE subjects has been largely incestuous, with the user playing a minor role. Subjects are usually

estimates are drafted by ONE. The participation of USIB representatives in the process and informal contacts with NSC staffers purports to take care of user interface.

3. First tackle the known problems. How to attack these problems?

a. Get user in the act by energizing NSCIC, lower intelligence profile in Working Group, get actual users from DOD. Selection of subjects and key questions to be addressed made an NSCIC function.

b. Set up an item-by-item, near real time system of National current intelligence support, which can be simply stepped up (rather than replaced) in crises.

4. In-house needs.

Over the long haul, we want to be in a posture to review and critique all national intelligence products as they are produced to insure responsiveness, quality, etc. Meantime, we operate in ad hoc task groups to solve known problems. I need personnel sufficiently grounded in the several substantive areas to wind up in the long-haul posture. Also, I need representation from all the production agencies to ensure the proper inputs to our reviews and recommendations.